This book demonstrates key trends in an extinct superpower, a troubled country in whose stability, modernization, and openness to the international community the West still has a huge stake. In this book he explores the origins and development of the revolutions of the post-Communist states.
European and American experts systematically compare U. Skip to content. Project Gutenberg updates its listing of IP addresses approximately monthly. Occasionally, the website mis-applies a block from a previous visitor. If your IP address is shown by Maxmind to be outside of Germany and you were momentarily blocked, another issue is that some Web browsers erroneously cache the block.
Trying a different Web browser might help. Or, clearing the history of your visits to the site. Please email the diagnostic information above to removing the spaces around the and we will try to help. And after that, as U. This riveting inside record joins history and journal to recount to the full story of U. From Cold War to Hot Peace is a fundamental record of the most noteworthy worldwide encounter within recent memory.
This is an extraordinary point of view on U. Spotlights the disappointment of the United States in financing a feeling of harmony in Russia by supporting its monetary changes after the part of the arrangement War. Beverly Hills: Sage.
New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston. Bull, Hedley. New York: Columbia University Press. Giddens, Anthony. Little, Richard. Murray, Robert W. United Kingdom: e-International Relations. Royo, Joseph. During the Cold War, critics often advocated for a redefinition on the grounds that the quest for stability led to a nuclear policy that was at variance with effective deterrence. More recent arguments for reconceptualization—and even abandonment—tend to be based on the assertion that strategic stability premised on Cold War logic is about as relevant today as the challenge of defending the Fulda Gap from advancing Soviet armor.
Yet, for all the talk of redefining strategic stability, the reality is that its proponents have never actually been able to coalesce around a single definition where, that is, they have chosen to define it at all. Edward Warner, who served as the U. The U. Yet, occasionally the NPR report appears to impute broader meaning to stability.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lav rov, for instance, has stated that Russia will not agree to further nuclear arms reductions unless all factors affecting strategic stability are addressed. If anything, this usage appears to be consistent with the second of the three definitions listed above. In an interesting twist, there is a debate in China over whether the concept of strategic stability is even applicable to the Sino-U. Without an agreed definition of such a common term, arguments about the pros and cons of, say, ballistic missile defense or high-precision conventional weapons tend to be at cross purposes, creating much heat and little illumination.
Indeed, critics tend to capitalize on this confusion, arguing that the term is ill-defined or setting up a weak definition as a straw man.
Accordingly, it is useful to ask—as this chapter does—how the term should be defined. Definitions are, of course, to some extent arbitrary; strategic stability could be defined in all the ways Warner identifies above and more. But the principal criterion for how it should be defined ought to be conceptual clarity.
A good definition for strategic stability might conceivably lead to more agreement on policy prescriptions, and, even if not, it might enable a better understanding of why we disagree.
Schelling observed that, in a crisis, the fear of being pre-empted could itself create pressure to pre-empt. In consequence, two states could be pushed over the brink of war because one state decided the risks of striking first outweighed the risks of waiting to be struck. It bears emphasizing from the outset that Schelling never argued that such dynamics were the only—or even perhaps the main—reason why states would go to nuclear war.
By analogy with crisis stability, my preferred definition of arms race stability is the absence of perceived or actual incentives to augment a nuclear force—qualitatively or quantitatively—out of the fear that in a crisis an opponent would gain a meaningful advantage by using nuclear weapons first.
The Cold War discourse on stability—crisis stability in particular—was overly narrow in two important ways. First, concern generally focused on the possibility of a state launching a large-scale damage-limiting first strike if it believed nuclear war had become imminent.
An alternative would be the limited use of nuclear weapons in an attempt to scare the opponent into backing down. This form of crisis instability seems much more likely than a large-scale damage-limiting first strike. Indeed, in a conflict against the United States, only Russia has anything approaching the capability to execute such a strike. These characteristics the hardness of silos, the accuracy of missiles, the effect of missile interceptors, and so on are only some of the factors that would play into a decision to pre-empt.
First strike stability is, therefore, a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for crisis stability. The sometimes exclusive focus on the technical characteristics of strategic forces arose at least in part because these factors could be easily quantified, whereas other factors relevant to crisis stability—emotion, pressure, bad advice, miscalculation, misperception or poor communication—could not.
During the Cold War, tremendous efforts were put into developing mathematical models for first strike stability. The aim was to quantify the incentives to strike first by modelling a nuclear exchange and using the results to determine whether either side was best served by waiting or attacking. These efforts certainly had some value; ensuring that vulnerable nuclear forces did not encourage pre-emption was important, and, for that matter, it still is.
But, because the models narrowly focused on only some of the potential causes of nuclear war they were, as their developers sometimes acknowledged, limited and they attracted considerable and reasonable criticism. However, a number of contemporary analysts have gone further and used the inadequacies of such models to attack the entire concept of strategic stability. Such an attack is unreasonable; there is a clear difference between the concept of stability and specific, contingent mathematical models that try to quantify it.
Using the inadequacies of such models to reject the former is like dismissing the concept of nuclear deterrence out of distaste for the game theoretic analysis that is beloved by a small number of formal deterrence strategists. This is certainly not to argue that the technical characteristics of weapon systems are irrelevant to strategic stability.
Indeed, the range of relevant systems has broadened as a result of technological change. Today, however, there are concerns—particularly among potential U. These fears—whether or not they are technically justified—could lead to anxieties about the possibility of a pre-emptive strike during a crisis. Strategic stability is usually defined as the combination of crisis stability and arms race stability.
This definition suffers from the disadvantage of making crisis stability and arms race stability appear to be fundamentally different phenomena. In reality, they are actually two manifestations of the same phenomenon on very different timescales.
0コメント